Purpose: In this paper I investigate the information fl ow between the credit default swap market and the stock market as well as insider trading in the credit default swap market.
| Introduction
In the literature on the subject there is a rather widely accepted defi nition of the phenomenon of insider trading. Insider trading per se is obtaining information from non-public sources and using it for purposes of enhancing one's fi nancial advantage (Machan, 1996) . Entities that are in the possession of such information exploit the difference between the economically justifi ed value of the company (or fi nancial instrument) and its market value (Avgouleas, 2005) . In this paper, I will also refer to the phenomenon of insider trading as insider transactions. Any information that concerns a given company and that has not yet been made public and has a potentially material impact on the price of the fi nancial instruments issued by the given entity or its associated derivative instruments, such as options, should be treated with confi dentiality. Confidential and material information can include, for example, information about planned mergers, acquisitions, announcement of interim results (Skaife, Veenman and Wangerin, 2013) , or information about changes in fi nancial forecasts. Insider transactions are therefore based on information asymmetry between entities operating within the organization and external stakeholders 2 .
In the fi nancial market the phenomenon of insider trading has been analyzed for many years, mainly in terms of the stock market. It was not until the emergence of innovative financial instruments, which allowed investors to buy protection against credit risk, such as credit derivatives, that researchers started showing interest in the considered phenomenon also in other segments of the fi nancial market.
One of the methods of researching the occurrence of the phenomenon of insider trading in the credit derivatives market and the flow of information between the market of the considered derivative instruments, the stock market and the bond market is the event study methodology.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the incidence and severity of the phenomenon of insider trading in the credit derivatives market for European companies, as well as an analysis of the fl ow of information between the market of the considered derivative instruments and the stock market. My main focus is the response time of the stock market and the credit default swap (CDS) market to occurring credit risk events and credit risk information. The in this paper presented analysis is of particular signifi cance in terms of the existing gap in the literature on the subject. While the phenomenon of insider trading is described in terms of credit derivatives in the U.S. market, there are no research studies concerning the European market. The analysis is based on 175,874 observations collected for 92 companies between the years 2001 and 2010.
The main hypothesis of this paper has been formulated as follows: the credit derivatives market is particularly susceptible to insider transactions based on confi dential information by virtue of its features, which include, in particular:
| Literature Review
Basically, two research areas associated with using the event study methodology can be identifi ed. The fi rst one is the identifi cation of the phenomenon of insider trading. The second area of interest to authors that use the event study methodology is the information fl ow between the respective segments of the fi nancial market.
Analyses of the literature on the subject in terms of using the event study methodology for the identifi cation of the phenomenon of insider trading generally focus on three areas:
• offering abnormal returns in the stock market through transactions based on confi dential information;
• the impact of information asymmetry within the organization on the phenomenon of insider trading;
• structuring insider transactions.
The most widely discussed issue in the literature on insider transactions is the study of achieving abnormal returns as a result of such transactions. Generally speaking, insider trading activity is associated with abnormal returns (Lakonishok and Lee, 1998; Del Brio, Miguel and Perote, 2002; Wiśniewski, 2004; Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser 1999) , while it represents only a small proportion of all the transactions in relation to the values of the company. Del Brio, Miguel and Perote (2002) demonstrate, based on the example of internal trading in the Spanish market, that other investors are not able to achieve the same rate of return as those that have access to confidential information. Additionally they claim that, in the long term, insider transactions do not provide valuable information from the point of view of external investors.
The research conducted by Etebari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2004) on a sample of trades by insiders in New Zealand provides interesting insights. Based on this study it should be concluded that both in the case of purchase and sale transactions the initiators of insider transactions are able to achieve higher rates of return on stock by considerably shifting the time of disclosing information on the by them concluded transactions. When comparing purchase and sale transactions, it can be concluded that the rate of return is greater for the fi rst category.
Another area that the analyses of researchers studying insider transactions focus on is the information asymmetry present within the organization. The results obtained by Etebari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2004) demonstrate that the position of the entity that has access to confi dential information within the organization determines the scale of information asymmetry. An analysis of cumulative abnormal returns suggests that those with the least access to confi dential information -independent directors of the Board of Directors -achieve the lowest rates of return on insider transactions.
Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser claim that in the case of the number of transactions of sale as well as purchase, transactions conducted by independent members of the Board of Directors and Managers are dominant. However, there is a certain tendency in terms of the size of the transactions, expressed by their market value. Transactions conducted by top-level managers are on average two times bigger than those conducted by others. This group dominates also in terms of the number of conducted large purchase transactions. This demonstrates the existence of information advantage on the side of top-level management.
In summary, it can be concluded that insider trading occurs on a larger scale, both in terms of the number of concluded transactions and the fi nancial results of the transactions, in the upper echelons of management. This is confi rmed by the existence of information asymmetry not only between investors operating within the organization and external ones, but also within the organization itself. This information asymmetry is manifested by the fact that executive directors are better informed than directors at lower levels within the organizational structure.
The third issue in terms of identifying the phenomenon of insider trading are the strategic activities of internal entities while concluding transactions. According to the earlier mentioned authors, Etebari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2004) , entities that have access to confi dential information achieve abnormal rates of return on stock by making a number of small transactions, gradually selling their fi nancial instruments. This points to a strategic division of insider transactions into many small transactions. Such conduct is diffi cult to detect for external investors or supervisory authorities, thus allowing for a higher rate of return. Planning transactions in terms of their size is additionally aided by the fl awed regulations of the market in question, in which there is no obligation for all the initiators of insider transactions to inform about the concluded transactions within a short period of time.
The second area of interest to authors that use the event study methodology, as already mentioned, is the information flow between the respective segments of the financial market.
Researchers focus on the fl ow of information regarding the fi nancial situation of a given company from the stock market to the bond market and the impact of information on ratings on the stock, bond and credit default swap markets. Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1996) in their research on companies in the U.S. market, observed a fl ow of information from transactions concluded in the stock market by entities operating within organizations to the bond market. The research results indicate that there is a certain amount of information in the stock market that has signifi cant economic importance for the bond market. They also examined the response of the stock market to the publication of information on the purchases and sales of bonds by well-informed entities. The results suggest that the response of the bond market is more signifi cant in economic terms than the response of the stock market, which can be explained by a greater informational effi ciency of the stock market. Norden and Weber (2004) considered changes in returns on stocks and CDS premium changes of European companies as a result of information on changes in ratings as well as changes in rating outlooks made by three rating agencies: Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch. The results of the analysis indicated the presence of negative and statistically signifi cant abnormal rates of return on stock in relation to rating downgrades in windows prior to the event. Whereas no statistically signifi cant abnormal rates of return were observed in the periods after rating downgrades. When analyzing credit default swaps, a statistically signifi cant, positive change of CDS premiums was noted in all the analyzed windows prior to the event in the form of rating downgrades as well as in the event window (-1, 1) . Just as in the case of the stock market, no statistically signifi cant high premium changes in terms of CDS premiums were noted in most periods after the event. No statistically signifi cant response was noted in the credit default swap market in the periods after announcing negative rating outlooks. Furthermore, the response to the announcement of negative rating outlooks was stronger than in the case of the announcement of rating downgrades. Hull, Predescu and White (2004) analyzed the impact that positive and negative changes in credit ratings, the announcement of positive and negative rating outlooks, as well as credit quality reviews for downgrades or for upgrades conducted by the company Moody's have on CDS premium changes. In the case of negative credit risk events it should be noted that all three types of events were anticipated by the credit default swap market. The strongest response was observed in the case of rating downgrades.
According to Daniels and Jansen (2005) , changes in risk premiums in the CDS market and the bond market after downgrades occur not only within one day after the event, but also several days before and after the event. This could suggest that the response of CDS premiums and bonds does not occur until some time after the event. The aforementioned authors also observed that the credit default swap market surpassed the corporate bond market in terms of disclosure of the information contained in ratings. Using the event study methodology they investigated whether rating changes are, within a short period after their occurrence, refl ected in changes of CDS contract or corporate bond pricing. The results of the DOI: 10.7206/mba.ce. 2084-3356.79 Vol. 21, No. 4(123), 2013 event study concerning the rating upgrades and downgrades indicate that in the case of rating upgrades a statistically signifi cant CDS premium change occurred only in the period from 1 to 15 days after the event. A different situation occurred with respect to downgrades, where statistically signifi cant changes in credit default swap premiums were observed in all the event windows. Changes in ratings had a greater impact on CDS premiums than on credit premiums. This could be the result of the greater liquidity of the CDS market. This means that the information contained in the ratings is refl ected more quickly in CDS contract pricing than in bond credit risk premiums.
According to M. Micu, E. Remolona and P. Wooldridge (1996) information on ratings given by several rating agencies has a greater impact on the market of CDS contracts than information given by one institution assessing the credit risk of a given company. They also observed a stronger response of CDS premiums to information related to the credit rating for small companies compared to larger companies, where the size was measured based on stock market capitalization. With regard to small and medium-sized companies future credit rating outlooks turned out to be statistically insignifi cant. This analysis result is associated with the number of analysts who study the fi nancial situation of small companies. Due to the fact that in the market there is more information available concerning large companies, information that appears for a small company usually leads to a greater change in market prices. Taking into account the breakdown by rating level, the greatest impact on changes in CDS premiums were observed for the rating class on the border between investment and speculative grade ratings. Similar results were observed in the group of positive information about ratings.
Credit quality reviews for future downgrades or for upgrades had the biggest impact on CDS contract pricing. Both in terms of negative and positive events, the greatest impact on CDS premiums was observed in the sub-sample of entities with a non-investment grade rating or with the highest investment grade rating.
Research results concerning the fl ow of information between markets indicate a fl ow of information from the stock market to the corporate bond market. No information fl ow in the opposite direction was observed. Negative credit risk events have a greater impact on stock prices, credit default swap premiums and bond yields than positive events. The CDS market is more responsive to events concerning ratings than the bond market, which could be the result of the greater liquidity of the CDS market. The response of the credit default swap market is also faster than the response of the stock market. Particularly the changes of CDS premiums occur faster than changes of the rates of return on stock in relation to credit quality reviews for future downgrades.
| Characteristics of the Study Sample
To investigate the phenomenon of insider trading I used a sample of 92 European companies, for which the Bloomberg system contained stock price quotes and credit default swap quotes 3 with From the initial number of 125 companies selected for analysis on the basis of belonging to that index I discarded 33 companies for which there were no stock price quotes, credit default swap quotes or the time series for one of the considered fi nancial instruments was too short. I analyzed the data from the years [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The average length of the time series -in the case of credit default swap contracts and stocks -amounted to 1912 observations, with a minimum value of 1582 and a maximum value of 2349 (Table 1) . For the study I applied mid prices from working days. For 89 of the analyzed companies the last price observation is from 30 August 2010, and in the case of the remaining 3 companies slightly different time series for the data were recorded 5 . The average value of the premium paid for credit risk protection in the sample was 73.4 bps, the minimum value was 3.3 bps, and the maximum value was 1,950 bps. The median value was lower than the mean value and amounted to 47.0 bps. (Table 2) . In the analyzed group of entities I singled out four types of events:
1) an event carrying negative information concerning a negative outlook on ratings;
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2) a rating downgrade;
3) a negative surprise in terms of fi nancial results -the announced annual fi nancial results were at least 5% lower than expected by market analysts; 4) a rating upgrade.
For each of the above-mentioned events I analyzed the response of the stock market and the credit default swap market using the event study methodology.
| Research Method
I use the event study methodology by applying the following market model:
where: R i,t -realized rate of return on stock of company i on day t;  i -absolute term;  i -sensitivity coeffi cient of stock price changes of company i in relation to rate of return of the stock market index; R m, t -realized rate of return on the market index m on day t;
The market model residuals described as (Kowalewski 2006) : (2) where: AR i,t -model residuals for company i on day t; E(R i,t ) -expected rate of return on stock of company i on day t; constitute the abnormal return (AR).
The market model assumes that abnormal return on stock is defi ned as follows (Kowalewski 2006) :
I use a similar method for estimating abnormal CDS premium changes: where: ACDS i,t -abnormal CDS premium change for company i on day t; CDS i,t -realised CDS premium change for company i on day t; CDS avg,t -realised average CDS premium change in the research sample.
To calculate the abnormal return on stock and abnormal CDS premium changes I use an event window of 41 days, where the window includes the following:
• the day of the event;
• 20 days prior to the event;
• 20 days after the event;
and an estimation window of 150 days. The event window is 79 days away from the estimation window 6 . For each of the considered credit risk events or events carrying information on credit risk, i.e. a negative outlook on ratings, rating downgrades, rating upgrades or the announcement of annual fi nancial results that are worse than expected by the market, I calculate the average abnormal returns on stock (AR) and the average abnormal CDS premium changes (AP) as well as the average cumulative abnormal returns on stock (CAR 
| Results
The results of the event study I will present per type of event. I will fi rst present the fi ndings with respect to events concerning ratings. Subsequently, I will focus on events associated with rating upgrades. The entire presentation of the research fi ndings will be concluded with an overview of the response of the CDS market and the stock market to the announcement of a negative surprise regarding annual fi nancial results.
| Credit Risk Events and Events Carrying Negative Information on Credit Risk Concerning Credit Ratings
As regards negative information on credit risk appearing in the market, when rating agencies set a negative outlook on a rating, one can observe the anticipation of setting the negative outlook on the rating of entities that have access to confi dential information in the CDS market. This regularity is illustrated in Figure 1 .
An analysis of the average abnormal CDS premium changes on days t=-2, -1, 0, +1, +2 indicates that there are investors in the market that have access to confi dential information and who use this information to gain additional fi nancial benefi ts. During the second and fi rst day prior to the event occurring in the credit default swap market, statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal CDS premium changes can be observed. Also during the three subsequent days statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal CDS premium changes can be observed. While in the stock market a negative response can be observed not until 1 day after the event. The exact values of AR and AP are presented in Table 3 .
The highest statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal CDS premium change can be observed on the day of setting a negative outlook on ratings (5,2%), and in particular a high level of signifi cance of 1%, based on which the null hypothesis can be rejected, according to which on the day of the event the average abnormal premium is zero. Players that are better informed react before day t=0, and on the day itself or after it -those that do not have access to confi dential information. What should be noted here are certain signs of an anticipatory response of CDS contract pricing compared to stock prices. While the fi rst statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal CDS premium change occurred on the second and fi rst day before setting a negative outlook on ratings, the statistically signifi cant, negative abnormal rate of return on stock does not occur until the fi rst day after the event. Further statistically signifi cant, negative average abnormal returns on stock can be observed on the fi fth and eighteenth day after the event, while in the CDS market statistically signifi cant, positive average credit risk premiums occur still for two days after the event. This indicates a faster discounting of information in the prices of credit default swap contracts compared to the stock market. In the stock market, on the fi rst day after the appearance of negative information regarding credit risk resulting from a negative outlook on ratings in the market, a statistically signifi cant, negative average abnormal rate of return on stock (-0 .8%) can be observed. *, **, *** -in the Corrado rank test indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis H0: on the given day the average abnormal rate of return is zero with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%; in the Student's t-test indicates the statistical signifi cance of the given abnormal rate of return with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%.
Source: own elaboration.
The negative response of the stock market to the appearance of negative information regarding credit risk resulting from setting a negative outlook on ratings is also refl ected in the cumulative average abnormal rates of return on stock. Table 4 and Figure 2 demonstrate the cumulative average abnormal rates of return on stock and the CDS premium changes resulting from setting a negative outlook on ratings. In three windows, i.e. [-20; -1] , [-10; -1] and [-5; -1] , the cumulative *, **, *** -in the sign test indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis H0: in the given event window CAR/ CAP the cumulative abnormal rates of return associated with setting a negative outlook on ratings is zero with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%; in the Student's t-test indicates the statistical signifi cance of the given abnormal rate of return with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%.
average abnormal rates of return on stock are negative and statistically signifi cant, indicating that the stock market anticipated the negative outlook on ratings 7 .
In the case of the CDS market we can also observe the effect of anticipating a negative outlook on ratings. Cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes at fi rst grow rapidly and then decrease in subsequent windows as the day of the event moves away, which could suggest that the information regarding setting a negative outlook on ratings has already been discounted earlier in CDS contract pricing. With respect to the stock market an opposite tendency can be observed, i.e. increasing, in terms of absolute negative values, cumulative abnormal rates of return on stock. All the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal changes of CDS contract pricing speak in favor of the hypothesis regarding the occurrence of the phenomenon of insider trading in the credit default swap market in relation to an event carrying information on credit risk regarding setting a negative outlook on ratings. Statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes prior to the day of the event indicate the presence of inward investors that have access to confi dential information in relation to the event in question. Another probable scenario is a fl ow of information from the CDS market to the stock market given the delayed response of the average abnormal rates of return on stock.
Figure 3 presents statistically signifi cant average abnormal rates of return on stock and CDS premium changes associated with rating downgrades. The fi rst statistically signifi cant, positive abnormal CDS premium changes already occur on the twentieth and seventeenth day before the rating downgrade. The subsequent CDS premium change that we are currently interested in occurred two days before the event. It is also evident that not all inward investors are equally well-informed, because some of them conduct transactions only after the information about the rating downgrade appears in the market, i.e. on the day of the event, and two days after the event. As shown in Table 5 , on days t=0, +1, +2 statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal CDS premium changes can be observed.
The stock market responds to rating downgrades with average abnormal rates of return of an opposite sign than expected. Statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal returns on stock can be observed on the twentieth, the ninth and the third day prior to the event, continuing still on the day of the event and on the third day after the event. In view of the response of stock prices to rating downgrades, which is contrary to the expected, it is diffi cult to conclude based on the obtained results whether or not there is an anticipatory response of one of the markets of the analyzed fi nancial instruments to the occurrence of a credit risk event involving a rating downgrade.
Anticipation of rating downgrades and the activity of investors that have access to confi dential information in the credit default swap market is confi rmed by an analysis of the cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes presented in Table 6 . Statistically signifi cant, positive cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes occurred, for example, in the period from the twentieth up to one day prior to the rating downgrade and they reached the level of 6.5%. In the period from the tenth up to one day prior to the rating downgrade also statistically significant, positive cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes can be observed (2,3%).
Certain signs of the stock market anticipating rating downgrades are provided by an analysis of the cumulative average abnormal rates of return on stock, which are presented in Figure 4 . In the period from the twentieth up to one day prior to the rating downgrade I observed the occurrence of a statistically signifi cant, negative cumulative average abnormal return on stock equal to 0.9% at a significance level of 0.05. It should be noted that the anticipation in the CDS market of a rating downgrade in that same period is stronger -a statistically signifi cant, positive cumulative average abnormal CDS premium change of 6.5% occurred at a signifi cance level of 0.05. The last conclusion could suggest that the information contained in credit risk events involving rating downgrades is more important from the point of view of inward investors in the CDS market than in the stock market. Furthermore, in other event windows, which ended before the time of the event, the cumulative average abnormal rates of return on stock are equal to zero, instead of the expected negative values. *, **, *** -in the Corrado rank test indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis H0: on the given day the average abnormal rate of return is zero with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%; in the Student's t-test indicates the statistical signifi cance of the given abnormal rate of return with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%.
All the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal changes of CDS contract pricing in relation to credit risk events involving rating downgrades indicate that rating downgrades are anticipated and point to the occurrence of the phenomenon of insider trading in the credit default swap market with respect to the analyzed European companies. In terms of the stock market rating downgrades are anticipated only in the case of an event window [-20; -1] .
In the subsequent part of this section I would like to compare the response of the CDS market and the stock market to setting a negative outlook on ratings and rating downgrades. What should be noted here is the stronger response of investors in the CDS market to setting a negative outlook on ratings than to rating downgrades. On the fi rst and second day prior to the event as well as after the event higher statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal CDS premium changes can be observed as a result of setting a negative outlook on ratings than in the case of rating downgrades. An analysis of the cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes *, **, *** -in the sign test indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis H0: in the given event window CAR/ CAP the cumulative abnormal rates of return associated with the given event (rating downgrade) is zero with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%; in the Student's t-test indicates the statistical signifi cance of the given abnormal rate of return with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%.
Figure 4 | Cumulative average abnormal rates of return on stock (CAR i, ) and CDS premium changes (CAP i, ) resulting from rating downgrades
Source: own elaboration. confi rms the conclusion regarding the stronger response of CDS premiums to setting a negative outlook on ratings than to rating downgrades. While in all the analyzed event windows statistically signifi cant, positive cumulative average CDS premium changes in relation to rating downgrades as well as in relation to setting a negative outlook on ratings can be observed, in the case of the appearance of negative information regarding credit risk resulting from a negative outlook on ratings the cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes are higher (with the exception of two windows: [+1; +10] and [+1; +20]) than in the case of rating downgrades and in all the cases there is a statistical signifi cance at a signifi cance level of 0.01.
In the case of rating downgrades a statistically signifi cant, negative response of the stock market only occurred in window [-20; -1] . With regard to the response of the rates of return on stock to setting a negative outlook on ratings the evidence that investors having access to confi dential information anticipate this event is provided by an analysis of the cumulative average abnormal rates of return on stock. In three event windows ending one day prior to the event statistically signifi cant cumulative average abnormal returns on stock can be observed. This means that there is a stronger response of the stock market to setting a negative outlook on ratings than to rating downgrades.
Generally it can be said that the response of both the stock market and the CDS market is stronger in the case of setting a negative outlook on ratings than in the case of rating downgrades. In the stock market this is evident based on the cumulative average abnormal rates of return and in the credit default swap market based on the average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes.
| Events Carrying Positive Information on Credit Risk
The credit default swap market responded with high, positive average CDS premium changes to rating downgrades and setting a negative outlook on ratings. With regard to events carrying positive information on credit risk, such as rating upgrades, an asymmetric response occurs. As shown in Figure 5 , the statistically signifi cant average abnormal CDS premium changes are lower in absolute value than before. Statistically signifi cant, negative average CDS premium changes occur on the fi fth, third and second day prior to the rating upgrade, and on the fi rst day after this event, and are as follows: 1%; 1.1%; 1.2% and 1.6%
The values of the average abnormal rates of return on stock and CDS premium changes resulting from rating upgrades are presented in Table 7 . Compared to the statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal CDS premium changes, which I observed in the case of setting a negative outlook on ratings -on days t = -2 (2%), t = -1 (2.2%), t = 0 (5.2%) -statistically signifi cant, negative average abnormal CDS premium changes occurred with a considerably lower absolute value. This shows that the response of the investors of the CDS market to an event carrying negative information on credit risk involving setting a negative outlook on ratings becomes stronger as the day of the event approaches, while in case of an event carrying positive information on credit risk, such as a rating upgrade, it remains at a similar level.
The conclusion regarding the asymmetric response of the CDS market to negative and positive events is also confirmed by an analysis of cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes, as shown in Table 8 . Statistically significant, negative cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes in relation to rating upgrades occur in windows: [-20; -1] , [-10; -1] and [-5; -1] and are in the range of 2% to 3%. In the case of setting a negative outlook on ratings, statistically significant, positive cumulative average CDS premium changes occur in the amount of: 9.3%; 5.5% and 5.6% respectively in the three above-mentioned windows.
Higher absolute values of cumulative average CDS premium changes prior to the day of the event only occurred in window [-20; -1 ] and amounted to 6.5% for rating downgrades and -1.7% for rating upgrades. This shows that events carrying negative information on credit risk are more interesting from the standpoint of external investors, particularly when it concerns setting a negative outlook on ratings, than events carrying positive information on credit risk.
In general the stock market responds poorly to rating upgrades. Statistically signifi cant average abnormal rates of return on stock assume small values and their sign is variable. After the day of the event no statistically signifi cant average abnormal rates of return on stock occur at all. A certain degree of anticipation of rating upgrades in the stock market is suggested by the statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal rate of return on day t = -4 in the amount of 0.2% (signifi cance level 0.1). A similar situation occurs when we take the cumulative average abnormal returns on stock that are presented in Figure 6 and Table 8 as the basis for our considerations. *, **, *** -in the Corrado rank test indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis H0: on the given day the average abnormal rate of return is zero with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%; in the Student's t-test indicates the statistical signifi cance of the given abnormal rate of return with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%.
In window [-20; -1] a statistically signifi cant, positive cumulative abnormal rate of return on stock occurs in the amount of 0.4% at a signifi cance level of 0.1.
In the case of cumulative rates of return, also an asymmetric response of the stock market can be observed to events carrying positive information on credit risk in relation to the response to credit risk events and events carrying negative information on credit risk. In event window [-20 ; -1] a statistically signifi cant, negative cumulative abnormal rate of return on stock in relation to setting a negative outlook on ratings occurs in the amount of 0.5% at a signifi cance level of 0.1, and in the case of a rating downgrade in the amount of 0.9% at a signifi cance level of 0.05. These fi gures suggest that the value of information concerning a rating upgrade is lower in comparison to a credit risk event involving a rating downgrade. We can also observe a certain degree of information fl ow from the CDS market to the stock market. This is suggested by statistically signifi cant average abnormal CDS premium changes, which occur earlier than statistically signifi cant average abnormal rates of return on stock. To sum up the considerations on the response of the stock market and the credit default swap market to credit risk events, negative as well as positive information on credit risk associated with credit rating, a number of aspects should be considered. Firstly, an information fl ow from the CDS market to the stock market can be observed in the market of the analyzed companies. Statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal rates of return on stock occur in the fi rst instance in the market of the considered credit derivatives, and in the case of rating downgrades as well as in the case of setting a negative outlook on ratings the response of the CDS market is stronger than that of the stock market. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the CDS market of the analyzed European companies there is an anticipation of setting a negative outlook on ratings as well as the phenomenon of insider trading in relation to this event. Anticipating rating downgrades and the occurrence of insider transactions concerning this event I observed to a lesser extent than in the case of setting a negative outlook on ratings. Secondly, with regard to the stock market, an anticipation of rating downgrades can be observed. The response of stock prices to setting a negative outlook on ratings is negative, while the stock market responds with unexpected statistically signifi cant, positive abnormal rates of return, both average and cumulative, to rating downgrades. Thirdly, the markets of both types of fi nancial instruments respond asymmetrically to credit risk events and to events carrying negative and positive information on credit risk, which is evident based on the amounts of the average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal rates of return on stock and CDS premium changes. Finally, we can observe an information fl ow from the CDS market to the stock market in relation to setting a negative outlook on ratings and rating upgrades.
| Information on Credit Risk Associated with the Announcement of Annual Financial Results
The fl ow of information from the CDS market to the stock market and the occurrence of the phenomenon of insider trading in the European CDS market in the event of announcing a negative surprise regarding annual fi nancial results are not as evident as in the previously described credit risk events and events carrying negative information on credit risk. As shown in Figure  7 and Table 9 , in the fi rst instance statistically signifi cant average abnormal rates of return on stock can be observed on the fi fteenth and the fourteenth day prior to the event, with the fi rst average abnormal rate of return being negative (-0.4% ) and the second one positive (0.2%). The response of the CDS market to the announcement of a negative surprise regarding annual fi nancial results occurs a little later, i.e. on the ninth and the third day prior to the event. Both average abnormal CDS premium changes have the expected sign. They are positive and amount to: 0.4% and 0. 6% respectively for the ninth and the third day prior to the event.
On the day of the event I did not observe a statistically signifi cant response of either of the markets in the analyzed fi nancial instruments. On the fi rst day after the event a delayed response of the stock market occurs. The abnormal rate of return has the expected negative sign and amounts to -0.5%. The only statistically signifi cant, negative average abnormal rate of return on stock prior to the announcement of a negative surprise regarding annual fi nancial results occurs on the fi fteenth day prior to the event (-0.4%) . Based on one statistically signifi cant, negative average abnormal rate of return on stock it is diffi cult to conclude whether or not the stock market anticipates the event in question. The last statistically signifi cant, negative average abnormal rate of return on stock occurs on the sixth day after the event (-0.4%) . Also the analysis of cumulative average abnormal rates of return does not confi rm that investors of the stock market anticipate worse than expected fi nancial results.
The occurrence of a statistically signifi cant, negative stock price change after the day of the event can also be observed in cumulative average abnormal rates of return. As shown on Figure 8 and in Table 10 , in event windows [+1; +5] and [+1; +10] negative, cumulative average abnormal rates of return on stock occurred, which are statistically signifi cant at a signifi cance level of 0.01. It is worth noting that the cumulative average abnormal returns on stock in all the event windows ending one day prior to the event have a, contrary to the expected, positive sign. A similar regularity also occurred in other event windows: [-1 ; +1], [-10 ; +10] and [-20; +20] . In the case of the credit default swap market, directly after the day of the event no statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal CDS premium changes can be observed. Evidence for the existence of the phenomenon of insider trading in relation to a negative surprise appearing in the market regarding annual fi nancial results is weaker than in the case of setting a negative outlook on ratings. Average abnormal CDS premium changes indicate the presence of groups of inward investors that are informed to various degrees -well-informed investors execute transactions already on the ninth day prior to the event, while less-informed investors only on the third day prior to the event, which leads to the occurrence of statistically signifi cant, positive average abnormal CDS premium changes. *, **, *** -in the Corrado rank test indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis H0: on the given day the average abnormal rate of return is zero with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%; in the Student's t-test indicates the statistical signifi cance of the given abnormal rate of return with signifi cance levels of, respectively: 10%, 5% and 1%.
Source: own elaboration. An analysis of cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes suggests a fl ow of information from the CDS market to the stock market. In event windows [-20; -1] , [-10; -1] and [-5; -1 ] statistically signifi cant, positive cumulative average CDS premium changes can be observed (2.3%; 1.6% and 0.6%). However, these are considerably lower than the positive cumulative average CDS premium changes in the case of rating downgrades (6.5%; 2.3% and 1.6%), especially in relation to setting a negative outlook on ratings (9.3%; 5.5% and 5.6%). 
| Conclusions
The results of the event study indicate that there is a fl ow of information from the credit default swap market to the stock market and point to the occurrence of the phenomenon of insider trading in the mentioned credit derivatives market as regards the analyzed European companies. Evidence of entities having access to confi dential information can be found mainly in the case of setting a negative outlook on ratings.
As regards rating downgrades the response is considerably weaker, both in terms of absolute values and in terms of the number of statistically signifi cant, average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal CDS premium changes on the respective event days and event windows. The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns in the stock market indicate that in the market of the currently considered fi nancial instruments the phenomenon of anticipation of rating downgrades can be observed. In case information appears in the market regarding annual fi nancial results that are worse than expected, an even weaker -compared to events and information associated with credit rating -response can be observed of CDS contract pricing and stock prices. In this respect, the analysis results are less conclusive than in the case of credit risk events or negative information on credit risk involving ratings. This could be due to the fact that internal stakeholders have access to information on these results well before the negative surprise regarding the annual fi nancial results is announced in the market. Therefore, we should rather speak of a gradual response to negative information associated with annual fi nancial results. Among the group of analyzed companies we can also observe an asymmetric response to credit risk events and negative information on credit risk as well as to positive events. Stock markets and CDS markets respond with lower in terms of absolute values changes in prices and premiums to rating upgrades compared to credit risk events or events carrying negative information on credit risk. The asymmetry of the response is evident in the markets of both considered fi nancial instruments, especially compared to the case of setting a negative outlook on ratings. When comparing the response of both types of considered fi nancial instruments to rating downgrades and to setting a negative outlook on ratings, it should be concluded that in the case of the stock market as well as the CDS market a stronger response can be observed to information contained in announcements regarding setting a negative outlook on ratings.
